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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Keith Allan Brown appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence 
entered upon his conditional Alford pleas to voluntary manslaughter and 
accessory to grand theft. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Mr. Leslie Breaw was reported missing under suspicious circumstances 
after his vehicle was found seemingly abandoned. (Officer Ingram's Report, PSI 
attachment, p.A6.) Law enforcement received information that Brown, who was 
Breaw's neighbor, and his wife Tyrah Brown were also gone from the area, 
having left in a hurry. (Officer Ingram's Report, PSI attachment, p.A8.) The 
police also discovered Brown had conducted transactions using Breaw's debit 
card after Breaw's disappearance. (Officer Ingram's Report, PSI attachment, 
p.A9.) Breaw's body was ultimately found concealed in an area of brush near his 
abandoned vehicle. (PSI, p.2.) 
Brown was arrested in Florida on a fugitive warrant and extradited to 
Idaho on a grand theft charge. (Tr., p.166, L.12 - p.169, L.18.) The state 
charged Brown with first degree murder, grand theft by possession of stolen 
property, and felon in possession of a firearm. (R. pp.184-186.) Brown was later 
deemed unable to assist in his own defense and was ordered committed from 
August 25,2008 until January 13, 2009. (R., pp.486-488; 495-496; 591-592.) 
Following mediation (R., pp.812-814), the state filed an amended 
information charging Brown with voluntary manslaughter and accessory to grand 
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theft (R., pp.878-879). Brown filed a reservation of issues for appeal (R., pp.900-
901) and entered a conditional Alford plea to the amended charges with the 
following negotiated resolution: 
Your Honor, the terms of the plea agreement are that Mr. 
Brown will have an opportunity to present three additional motions 
- or basically it's one motion to suppress with three independent 
grounds. He will - the State will amend the charge to voluntary 
manslaughter, and the grand theft charge will be amended to 
accessory to a grand theft after the fact. Mr. Brown will enter Alford 
pleas to both charges and reserve his appellate rights in writing to 
challenge all pretrial motions. 
The sentences - the State would agree to have sentences 
on both charges run concurrently and that we would enter into a 
Rule 11 agreement with you, Your Honor, that you would after that 
any sentence imposed would run concurrently on both charges. 
Other than that, there would be open recommendations. The State 
has indicated it will recommend a fixed 15-year term. 
(Tr., p.377, L.12 - p.378, L.4.) 
The court sentenced Brown to 10 years fixed followed by five years 
indeterminate on the voluntary manslaughter and five years fixed for accessory 
to grand theft, the sentences to run concurrently. (Tr., p.452, L.14- p.453, L.5; 
R., pp.935-938; 941-944.) Brown timely filed a notice of appeal. (R., pp.959-
964.) 
Brown then filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. (R., pp.971-972.) 




Brown states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown's Motion to Exclude 
from Evidence Defendant's Mail Correspondence obtained in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown's motions to 
suppress evidence obtained as a result of his arrest because material 
exculpatory information discovered after the issuance of the arrest 
warrant undermined the magistrate's probable cause finding? 
3. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown's motion to suppress 
statements obtained when he was incapable of intelligently and 
voluntarily waiving his right to remain silent because the State failed to 
establish that his statements were made voluntarily? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Brown's 
request to present testimony at the hearing on his Rule 35 motion and 
denied his motion without considering the new information he provided 
in support? 
5. Mindful of this Court's holding in State v. Manzaneres, did the district 
court err when it denied Mr. Brown's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Probable Cause at Preliminary Hearing? 
6. Mindful of the inapplicability of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (c) in a state court prosecution, did the district 
court nevertheless err when it denied Mr. Brown's motion to suppress 
statements obtained in violation of those provisions? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Brown failed to establish error in the district court's denial of his 
motion to exclude evidence of jail correspondence? 
2. Has Brown failed to show any error in the denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence obtained as a result of his arrest pursuant to a valid arrest 
warrant? 
3. Has Brown failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress 
statements as involuntary? 
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4. Has Brown failed to establish the district court erred in not allowing 
additional testimony at his Rule 35 plea for leniency? 
5. Has Brown failed to show any reason why State v. Manzaneres is not 
controlling? 
6. Has Brown failed to establish the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are 




Brown Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Exclude Mail 
Correspondence 
A. Introduction 
Brown challenges the denial of his motion to exclude evidence of his mail 
correspondence obtained while Brown was incarcerated. Specifically, Brown 
asserts 
the district court erred when it denied his motion because he 
established that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when 
the jail opened and photocopied all of his non-legal, outgoing mail 
without presenting evidence that such activities were conducted 
pursuant to a search warrant or a recognized exception to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) Because an inmate's privacy rights are necessarily 
limited and the state acted within its general practice, Brown's argument fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts." State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw 
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any 
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implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence. State v. 
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,218,984 P.2d 703,706 (1999). 
C. The District Court Correctly Denied Brown's Motion To Exclude Evidence 
Of His Mail Correspondence From Trial 
that 
In Mallery v. Lewis, 106 Idaho 227, 678 P.2d 19 (1984), this Court held 
security and governmental interest justifies the imposition of certain 
restraints on inmate correspondence. Such interference was held to 
be justified if the regulation or practice in question furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest such as security, 
order, or rehabilitation. Procunier, supra, held that the limitations of 
first amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or 
essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest 
involved. Id. at 413, 94 S.Ct. at 1811. 
Mallery, 106 Idaho at 231, 678 P.2d at 23 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 
396 (1974). "It is clear that the screening of mail for escape plans, obscene 
material, violation of prison rules, and contraband furthers a substantial 
governmental interest." kL. 
In denying Brown's motion to exclude evidence from his correspondence 
while in jail, the district court found: 
The - it seems to me that what - the issue has been framed 
in terms of a constitutional right to privacy, as I understand it, as 
opposed to any particular privilege claimed under the Idaho Rules 
of Evidence. And, first, it sounds like there was a policy in effect for 
the Bonner County jail regarding communications from prisoners 
and that there is really is no right to privacy, at least of the nature 
asserted here, to communications which would be in violation of jail 
rules. The attack here seems to be on the jail policy of monitoring 
mail. And it doesn't seem to me that probable case [sic] is probably 
required for such a policy, that there are good reasons for any jail to 
have such a policy and particularly with reasons related to security 
issues. 
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However, based upon the showing that's been made here 
today, to the extent that probable cause was required for 
implementation of the jail policy with respect particularly to Mr. 
Brown, that probable cause did exist. It seems to me also that the 
policy, itself, is a constitutional - the policy passes constitutional 
muster. Accordingly, the motion regarding the defendant's mail 
correspondence is denied. 
(Tr., p.371, L.21 - p.372, L.19.) Although Brown does not pursue a First 
Amendment claim on appeal (Appellant's brief, p.7, n.11), he does assert the 
district court erred in denying his motion to exclude correspondence "because he 
established that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the jail opened 
and photocopied all of his non-legal, outgoing mail" without first obtaining a 
warrant or establishing a valid exception to the warrant requirement (Appellant's 
brief, p.8). 
Brown cites the Ninth Circuit for the proposition that an inmate has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a sealed letter. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) 
Brown cites specifically to U.S. v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1973), 
which held "absent a showing of some justifiable purpose of imprisonment or 
prison security the interception and photocopying of the letter was violative of the 
fourth amendment and the letter should have been excluded as evidence." 
However, not even the Ninth Circuit has been consistent its interpretation of the 
privacy nature of inmate jail. In a case predating Savage, it noted "prison officials 
may examine the communications of a prisoner without infringing upon his 
rights." U.S. v. Wilson, 447 F.2d 1,8, n. 4 (9th Cir. 1971). 
Other courts have recognized that the expectation of privacy by those 
incarcerated is necessarily limited: 
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In Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15,40 S.Ct. 50,64 L.Ed. 103 
(1919), the Supreme Court held that interception by prison 
personnel and use in evidence by the prosecution of certain letters 
containing incriminating material written by a federal prisoner, who 
had been charged with the murder of a prison guard, did not violate 
the fourth amendment rights of the accused. The Court noted that 
the letters were voluntarily written and that no threat or coercion 
was used to obtain them. The Court added that the letters came 
into the possession of officials of the penitentiary under established 
practice, reasonably designed to promote the discipline of the 
institution. (citation omitted). 
More recent cases since Stroud have held that a prisoner's 
fourth amendment rights are not violated when his mail is inspected 
by jail officials. See Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 427 (yth Cir. 
1977); U.S. v. Wilson, 447 F.2d 1, n. 4 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 
sub nom. Polk V. United States, 404 U.S. 1053, 92 S.Ct. 723, 30 
L.Ed.2d 742 (1972). Still more recent cases have limited Stroud, 
finding violations of the fourth amendment absent a showing of a 
justifiable purpose of imprisonment or prison security. (citations 
omitted). 
It is apparent, even if Stroud does not retain all of its vitality, 
that the actions of the prison officials were justified in light of the 
legitimate objectives of the prison system. In Lyons V. Farrier, 727 
F.2d 766, 769 (8th Circ.1984), this court held that, although 
prisoners retain some fourth amendment rights while in prison, 
these rights are limited by institutional security needs and the 
prisoner's reduced expectation of privacy. 
U.S. v. Kelton, 791 F.2d 101, 102-103 (8th Cir. 1986). 
We are cognizant of earlier federal decisions which found a 
limited right of privacy in inmate letters. See Palmigiano v. 
Travisono, 317 F.Supp.776 (D.R.1.1970); United States v. Savage, 
482 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1973). We feel, however, that the Supreme 
Court's announcement of valid government policies and procedures 
in Hudson [v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)] is sufficient to justify us 
in abandoning these cases. We are also cognizant of the 
considerable jurisprudence holding inmate mail may be censored 
for the furtherance of a substantial government interest such as 
security or discipline. (citations omitted.) We feel that if complete 
censorship is permissible, then the lesser included act of opening 
the mail and reading it is also permissible. (citations omitted.) 
State V. Dunn, 478 So.2d 659, 663 (LA Ct. App. 1985). 
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At least one court has recognized "the prevailing view is that there is no 
constitutional violation" in reading the outgoing mail of inmates. Busby v. Dretke, 
359 F.3d 708, 716 (5th Cir. 2004). See also Stow v. Grimaldi, 993 F.2d 1002, 
1004 (1st Cir.1993) (holding a "New Hampshire State Prison practice of requiring 
non-privileged outgoing mail to be submitted for inspection in unsealed 
envelopes" is not a constitutional violation); Smith v. Delo, 995 F.2d 827, 832 (8th 
Cir.1993) (prison officials justified in screening out-going non-privileged mail for 
escape plans, contraband, threats or evidence of illegality). If this Court follows 
the prevailing view that there is no constitutional violation in the review of inmate 
jail, the district court's order to deny Brown's motion to suppress must be 
affirmed. 
Brown contends the state did not meet its burden in establishing an 
exception to the warrant requirement. (Appellant's brief, p.10.) It is the state's 
position, however, that based on the aforementioned line of cases, such a 
showing is unnecessary. The district court found there was a jail policy in place 
"regarding communications from prisoners" (Tr., p.371, L.25 - p.372, L.2), and 
this finding has not been challenged. Brown's mail was reviewed in a manner 
consistent with that policy and was not a violation of a constitutionally protected 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Even if the Court were to require a basis for a warrantless search in the 
screening of outgoing inmate correspondence, the district court found that as 
well. The arguments presented to the district court at hearing on the motion to 
exclude included information of Brown's extensive criminal history, his previous 
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possession of identity fraud documents, his communications with convicted 
felons incarcerated elsewhere and his continued communications with other 
people charged with violent crimes, all which showed Brown presented security 
issues to the jail that justified the review of his outgoing correspondence. (See 
generally Tr., pp.368-370.) The district court not only found a valid government 
interest in screening Brown's mail but held the circumstances surrounding 
Brown's behavior and pattern of communications while incarcerated was 
sufficient probable cause to search his mail. (Tr., p.372, Ls.11-19.) The district 
court correctly denied Brown's motion to exclude. 
II. 
Brown Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Motion To Suppress Evidence Obtained As A Result Of The Execution Of A Valid 
Warrant For His Arrest 
A. Introduction 
Brown filed multiple motions in support of his position that any evidence 
obtained subsequent to his arrest pursuant to a warrant for the offense of grand 
theft was suppressible because the state failed to advise the original warrant 
issuing court of potentially exculpatory evidence discovered in the approximate 
one-month time period between the issuance of the arrest warrant and its 
subsequent execution. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-13.) 
Because there is nothing in the record to support a finding that false 
statements were knowing and intentionally made in the affidavit supporting the 
original arrest warrant, Brown's argument fails. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts." State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw 
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552,555,989 
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any 
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence. State v. 
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,218,984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999). 
C. Brown Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Denying 
His Motion To Suppress Evidence Obtained Subsequent To His Arrest 
In its order denying Brown's motion to suppress, the district court found 
the following: 
At a search warrant and arrest warrant hearing conducted in 
the afternoon of February 6, 2007[,] Bonner County Deputy Sheriff 
Tony Ingram testified that defendant had been seen using the 
financial transaction card of his employer, Leslie Breaw, who was 
apparently missing. Defendant and his wife lived in a house owned 
by Breaw, which was located next door to Breaw's house. 
Although there is evidence that another officer had information that 
Breaw had used the card after defendant used it, there is no 
evidence that, at the warrant hearing, Ingram knew about Breaw's 
subsequent use. Ingram testified that the card was missing from 
Breaw's wallet, which had been found in his apparently abandoned 
vehicle. He also testified that defendant had hurriedly moved away. 
The magistrate issued search and arrest warrants based upon a 
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finding of probable cause for "fraudulent use of a financial 
transaction card or grand theft." 
After the warrant hearing, police obtained information that 
Breaw's renters had paid defendant rent they owed Breaw, but 
apparently that rent money had never been forwarded to Breaw. 
Others told police that Breaw had used his financial transaction 
card after defendant used it. Police discovered that a $56,000 
escrow check belonging to Breaw was deposited into a bank 
account opened in the name of defendant's wife on January 24, 
2007 and closed the next day. Rebekah Harding [Brown's mother-
in-law] told police that on March 1 defendant had given her $7,000. 
Harding also told police that defendant had used Breaw's financial 
transaction card with Breaw's permission. Harding had moved 
away at the same time defendant and his wife moved. On March 
19, a dead body, suspected to be that of Breaw, was found in a 
wooded area near the homes of the defendant and Breaw. Police 
arrested defendant the next day. 
(2/1/10 Memorandum Opinion and Order re: Motions to Suppress, pp.2-3 
(citations omitted).) 
Brown moved to suppress the evidence found subsequent to his arrest 
pursuant to both the search warrant and the arrest warrant for grand theft, 
claiming an insufficient basis for a finding of probable cause. (R., pp.277-279, 
293-294.) Brown also gave notice of his intent to seek a Franks 1 hearing. (R., 
pp.648-649.) At the initial appearance on the Franks hearing, Brown asked the 
district court to decide if Brown had "made a substantial preliminary showing that 
there is a reason to give him a hearing to challenge" the statements made to the 
magistrate judge in issuing the arrest warrant for grand theft. (Tr., p.113, LsA-9.) 
Brown made clear at the hearing, however, he was not attempting to challenge 
the search warrant through a Franks hearing. (Tr., p.128, Ls.3-4.) 
In denying Brown's motion to suppress, the district court concluded: 
1 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
12 
The magistrate found probable cause for "fraudulent use of 
financial transaction card or grand theft" and issued search and 
arrest warrants as a result. According to defendant, probable 
cause for the arrest warrant would have been eliminated if Deputy 
[Ingram] had presented evidence that Breaw had used his financial 
transaction card after defendant used it. The record does not show 
that any such evidence was intentionally or recklessly withheld as 
required by Franks, or that Ingram even knew of this evidence at 
the warrant hearing. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how, at the 
warrant hearing, one could intentionally or recklessly omit unknown 
information. 
Even if at the warrant hearing Deputy Ingram had known of, 
and intentionally or recklessly omitted, evidence of Breaw's 
subsequent card use, defendant has not shown "a substantial 
probability" that had this evidence been presented at the warrant 
hearing, "it would have altered the magistrate's finding of probable 
cause." [Citation omitted.] The evidence presented at the hearing 
also included not only defendant's use of the card, but information 
from neighbors and family that Breaw's whereabouts were 
unknown; his dogs were unfed and running loose; his abandoned 
vehicle contained his wallet; his financial transaction card was 
missing from that wallet; and defendant and his wife had hurriedly 
moved from the area. This evidence combined with the allegedly 
omitted evidence supported the magistrate's probable cause 
determination. 
(Exhibit: 2/01/10 Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Motions to Suppress, 
pp.5-6.) In a subsequent hearing on the motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained pursuant Brown's arrest in Florida, the district court found the following 
when denying Brown's motion to suppress: 
Turning those general propositions to the issues before the 
court, the first issue is - concerns probable cause for the crime. At 
the search warrant hearing, a magistrate found probable cause to 
believe that defendant committed the crime of fraudulent use of a 
financial transaction card or grand theft. The evidence supporting 
this finding included a showing that Breaw was missing under 
suspicious circumstances at about the time the defendant was 
videotaped using his financial transaction card and that Breaw's 
wallet had been found in his abandoned truck with no financial 
transaction cards present and that defendant had hurriedly moved 
from his home that was located on the alleged victim's property. 
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The fair implication of this evidence was that the defendant had 
used the victim's card without permission, and these facts connect 
the circumstances of Mr. Breaw's disappearance to defendant's 
use of Breaw's card, providing probable cause to issue a search 
warrant for evidence related to his disappearance. 
(Tr., p.360, L.24 - p.361, L.i8.) 
Brown asserts on appeal the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress evidence made following his arrest in Florida when it "concluded that 
the magistrate's probable cause finding would not have been different had she 
been informed of the material exculpatory information learned after the issuance 
of the warrant but before its execution." (Appellant's brief, p.i8.) The original 
grand theft charge was dismissed by the state upon Brown's return to Idaho 
wherein a new criminal complaint was filed alleging the crimes of first degree 
murder, grand theft by possession, and felon in possession of a firearm with 
enhancements for being a persistent violator and for using a firearm in the course 
of the commission of one of the alleged crimes. (R., pp.54-56; Tr., p.137, Ls.1-
8.) When making the probable cause finding for the new charges, the magistrate 
took judicial notice of the testimony for the issuance of the previous search 
warrant over a month prior (R., pp.34-51) in addition to receiving more testimony, 
including statements Brown made to law enforcement after his arrest. (R., pp.51-
53.) Those statements appear to be the object of Brown's claim for suppression 
on appeal. Brown contends on appeal that had he not been arrested on an 
invalid warrant in Florida, he would not have been in a position to make 
statements against his interest which were later used as evidence for the 
charges filed against him upon his return to Idaho. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-1 g.) 
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Brown argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
evidence obtained as a result of his arrest pursuant to an invalid arrest warrant 
which should have been invalidated at the Franks hearing. (Appellant's brief, 
p.18.) Idaho courts do recognize Franks hearings in relations to search warrants: 
Idaho has adopted the rule established in Franks and has made 
clear that a warrant is valid even if probable cause is based on 
false evidence so long as the evidence is not presented 
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. 
State v. Fisher, 140 Idaho 365, 369-370, 93 F.3d 696, 700-701 (2004). The 
issue of the applicability of a Franks hearing to an arrest warrant, however, has 
not been considered by an Idaho appellate court and Brown points to no 
compelling reason why this court should adopt such a view. The Second Circuit 
noted in U.S. v. Awadallah, 349 F.3 42, 64 n. 17 (2nd Cir. 2003), that neither it nor 
the United States Supreme Court has extended the Franks holding to arrest 
warrants. (Citations omitted.) Although the Fourth and Fifth Circuit courts have 
extended Franks to arrest warrants, see ~ U.S. v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 299-
303 (4th Circ. 1990); U.S. v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 327-329 (5th Circ. 1980), there 
is still the necessary showing of a -"deliberate falsehood" or "reckless disregard 
for the truth." Colkley, 899 F.3d at 303 (citation omitted). Because there is no 
Idaho case law on point and Brown has shown no compelling reason, this Court 
should decline to apply the Franks holding to arrest warrants, thereby affirming 
without further inquiry the district court's denial of Brown's motion to suppress. 
However, if the Court does review the district court's Franks analysis and 
its subsequent denial of Brown's motion to suppress, Brown has failed to 
establish any error by the district court. Although he contends on appeal there 
15 
existed potentially exculpatory evidence found subsequent to the original 
probable cause finding, that is not the proper test under Franks. Brown appears 
to cite U.S. v. Marin-Buitrago, 734 F.2d 889, 894 (2nd Circ. 1984), holding 
when a definite and material change has occurred in the facts 
underlying the magistrate's determination of probable cause, it is 
the magistrate, not the executing officers, who must determine 
whether probable cause still exists. Therefore, the magistrate 
must be made aware of any material new or correcting 
information[,] 
for the proposition that law enforcement was under an ongoing obligation to 
present newly discovered information to the warrant issuing magistrate up to the 
point of arrest. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-20.) The existence of new information 
alone, however, does not end the inquiry. As discussed in U.S. v. Perez, 484 
F.3d 735, 743 (5th Cir. 2007), 
When this decision is read in full, however, it becomes clear 
that Marin-Buitrago does not support [the defendant's] position that 
the evidence from his residence be suppressed. Therein, the 
Second Circuit indicated that the evidence resulting from the search 
should be suppressed only when the new information brought the 
level of probability below what was necessary for probable cause. 
Thus the court stated that "[i]n determining on this appeal whether 
the affidavit still supports a finding of probable cause after the 
inclusion of [the new information], we must assume the role of the 
issuing magistrate." After concluding that "[e]ven with the 
supplemental information, the affidavit clearly establishes, by a fair 
probability," that the search would produce evidence of narcotics, 
and that therefore "the warrant for the search ... was supported by 
probable cause at the time it was executed," the court upheld the 
district court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. 
(Citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The record supports ,the district court's conclusion that the magistrate 
would have still found probable cause for the offense of grand theft by 
possession based on the circumstances surrounding the victim Breaw's 
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disappearance taken with the circumstances of Brown's actions and subsequent 
flight. Brown has failed to establish the district court erred in denying his motion 
to suppress. 
III. 
Brown Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To 
Suppress Statements To Law Enforcement as Involuntary 
A Introduction 
Brown asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
statements he made to law enforcement following his arrest because he was not 
capable of voluntarily waiving his right to remain silent because he was of 
unsound mind at the time the statements were made as was evidenced by 
Brown's subsequent court-ordered commitment based on the determination that 
he was incapable of assisting his defense. (Appellant's brief, pp.23-25.) 
Brown failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court, recognizing that the validity of a waiver of 
Miranda rights presents a question of fact, has held: 
When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this 
Gourt defers to the findings of the trial court unless they are clearly 
erroneous. When statements made by a defendant during the 
course of an in-custody interrogation are offered at trial, the State 
"must establish a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of the 
suspect's rights." The trial court's conclusion that a defendant made 
a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights will not be 
disturbed on appeal where it is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 
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State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 297, 1 P.3d 795, 798 (2000) (citations omitted). At 
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve 
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial 
court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102,106,897 P.2d 993,997 (1995). 
C. Brown Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion 
To Suppress Based On His Assertion That His Statements To Police 
Were Not Given Voluntarily 
Brown first appeared before the court in custody on the initial charges May 
3, 2007. (R., p.57.) An order of commitment was entered August 25, 2008 and 
amended September 10, 2008 ordering his continued commitment until it was 
deemed he was fit to proceed with trial. (R., pp.486-488; 495-496). Brown was 
deemed competent to assist in his own defense and proceed to trial in an order 
dated January 13, 2009. (R., pp.591-592.) Subsequently, a motion to suppress 
was filed February 25, 2010 moving to exclude any confessions made at the time 
of his arrest in 2007 as having been made under duress. (R., pp.269-270.) It 
does not appear from the record that motion was noticed for a hearing before the 
court. However, in an order filed September 13, 2010, the district court denied 
Brown's motion to suppress statements of the defendant and other evidence. 
(R., pp.923-924.) The motion, entitled "Motion to Suppress: Presentment to 
Magistrate; Involuntary Confession; and Dissipation of Probable Cause" was 
dated September 7, 2012 and addressed at the hearing on September 9, 2012 
wherein Brown ultimately entered his conditional Alford pleas. (R., p.923; see 
generally Tr., p.377-408.) The district court concluded when denying Brown's 
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motion that "any statements that [Brown] made to law enforcement agencies 
were not rendered involuntary based upon any claim of a mental health 
deficiency." (Tr., p.394, pp.14-17.) 
The State, "in attempting to introduce statements made by a suspect 
during a custodial interrogation and outside the presence of an attorney, must 
establish a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of the suspect's rights." 
State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 497, 660 P.2d 1336, 1340 (1983). In 
determining if a waiver is valid, a Court must examine "the totality of 
circumstances surrounding the statements to determine whether [they are] the 
product of a rational intellect and a free will." Mitchell, 104 Idaho at 499, 660 
P.2d at 1342 (citing State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 840, 537 P.2d 1369, 1376 
(1975)). "The test of voluntariness is whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the suspect's will was overborne by police coercion." State v. 
Rounsville, 136 Idaho 869,874,42 P.3d 100, 105 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Arizona 
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 
163-67 (1986); State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 191, 998 P.2d 80, 84 (2000); 
State v. Davila, 127 Idaho 888,892,908 P.2d 581, 585 (Ct. App. 1995)). A trial 
court's conclusion that a defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
waiver of Miranda rights will not be disturbed on appeal where it is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Luke, 134 Idaho at 297, 1 P.3d at 798. 
In this case, Brown supports his position that he was unable to voluntarily 
waive his right to remain s·i1ent at the time he was arrested prior to his 
incarceration in May of 2007 with the fact that he was found unfit to proceed or 
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assist in his own defense over one year later in August 2008. (Appellant's brief, 
p.24.) That is not the correct legal standard. The correct legal standard requires 
the trial court to determine, under a totality of the circumstances, whether the 
suspect's will was overborne by police coercion. Rounsville, 136 Idaho at 874, 
42 P.3d at 105. Factors courts have considered in determining the voluntariness 
of a waiver include whether Miranda warnings were given, the youth of the 
accused, the level of education, the length of the detention, repeated and 
prolonged nature of the questioning, and deprivation of food or sleep. State v. 
Person, 140 Idaho 934, 937, 104 P.3d 976, 979 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. 
Doe, 137 Idaho 519,523,50 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002)). The district court found 
that, based on its observations of Brown in court, Brown had been an active 
participant in the legal and factual issues discussed in his case and "any 
statements that he made to law enforcement agencies were not rendered 
involuntary based upon any claim of a mental health deficiency." (Tr., p.394, 
Ls.6-17.) Brown's claim that his mental condition was such that he did not 
knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights is unsupported by any evidence of 
what mental condition he had at the time he made incriminating statements to 
police or why it would have rendered him incapable of waiving his right to silence. 
Further, Brown makes no legal or factual argument as to how evidence of a 
subsequent inability to assist in his own defense renders a previous waiver of his 
right to silence invalid or involuntary. 
Brown has failed to establish any error in the denial of his motion to 
suppress statements made to law enforcement as involuntary. 
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IV. 
Brown Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not 
Allowing Additional Testimony Prior To Denying His Rule 35 Request For 
Leniency 
A Introduction 
Brown claims the district court abused its discretion when considering his 
Rule 35 request for leniency in his sentence by "unduly narrowing the scope of 
that discretion when it refused to allow him to testify or present witnesses in 
support" of that motion. (Appellant's brief, p.26.) Brown has failed to meet his 
burden in establishing the district court abused its discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Rule 35 of the Idaho Criminal Rules provides that the trial court may, in its 
discretion, decide a motion to modify a sentence without the admission of 
evidence and without oral argument. I.C.R. 35; State v. Arambula, 97 Idaho 
627,630,550 P.2d 130, 133 (1976); State v. Peterson, 126 Idaho 522,525,887 
P.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1994) (decision to conduct a hearing on a Rule 35 motion is 
directed to the sound discretion of the district court). This discretion is abused 
only if the court unreasonably refuses to consider relevant evidence or otherwise 
unduly limits the information considered before deciding a Rule 35 motion. State 
v. Bayles, 131 Idaho 624, 626, 962 P.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1998). 
C. Brown Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Discretion In The District 
Court's Refusal To Allow Additional Testimony In Support Of His Rule 35 
Motion 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of 
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the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159 
P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Brown entered conditional Alford pleas to the lesser 
amended charges of voluntary manslaughter and accessory to grand theft, 
reserving his right to appeal all pretrial motions. (R., pp.878-879; 900-902; Tr., 
p.377, L.12 - p.379, L.6.) At sentencing Brown called six witnesses on his 
behalf (Tr., p.411, L.8 - p.432, L.9) in addition to submitting additional letters of 
support (Tr., p.432, L.11 - p.433, L.6). Brown also submitted a pathologist's 
report and the report of a polygrapher to the court to aid in sentencing. (Tr., 
p.433, Ls.8-22.) Brown himself addressed the court. (Tr., p.444, L.15 - p.448, 
L.6.) 
At a hearing on Brown's Rule 35 motion, the district court was advised of 
Brown's desire to provide the testimony of expert witnesses in the form of a 
forensic pathologist, a firearms expert and a polygrapher. (See generally R35 
Tr., pp.6-7.) Rule 35 specifically grants the district court authority to "consider[ ] 
and determiner ]" a Rule 35 motion "without the admission of additional testimony 
and without oral argument." Consistent with Rule 35, the trial court denied the 
request for additional testimony finding: 
It doesn't seem to me that - that there is much to be gained 
here by calling a pathologist, a firearms expert, and a polygrapher. 
And as far as those - any testimony from those people would go to 
the - seems to me would go to issues of guilt, innocence or guilt, 
and that was taken care of when we took the plea. 
As far as Mr. Brown is concerned, had the opportunity, as I 
stated, and he submitted reams and reams of written material. So I 
think that anything he's had to present to the Court has been 
presented. So I'm going to exercise my discretion and deny the 
request for additional testimony. 
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A Rule 35 motion "shall be considered and determined by the court 
without the admission of additional testimony and without oral argument, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion." I.C.R. 35. itA Rule 35 hearing, if 
held, takes place after the defendant has been accorded his right to be present at 
sentencing. Thus, the sentencing judge may consider and decide the motion 
without any additional testimony." State v. Urias, 123 Idaho 751, 755, 852 P.2d 
503, 507 (Ct. App. 1993). The district court had discretion whether to allow oral 
argument and whether to allow the presentation of additional testimony. I.C.R. 
35. That it allowed the former and disallowed the latter does not show any abuse 
of discretion. Although Brown argues the district court abused its discretion by 
unduly limiting the information considered in support of his Rule 35 motion, that 
position is not supported by the record. Brown addressed the court on the very 
issues at sentencing for which he sought reduction of his sentence. Further, at 
sentencing he provided reports of two of the type of experts he wished to call at 
hearing. The district court determined "the best reading of the facts [did] support 
a finding of voluntary manslaughter with the death being at the hands of Mr. 
Brown following a quarrel with the decedent." (Tr., p.449, L.s24 - pA50, L.2.) 
As the district court determined in denying the request to present additional 
testimony in support of his Rule 35 motion, there was nothing additional to be 
gained from rehashing Brown's culpability as that was "taken care of" when the 
plea was entered. (R35 Tr., p.11, Ls.10-11.) 
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Brown has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying 
his request to present what amounted to testimony duplicative of what was 
addressed at sentencing in support of his request for leniency of sentence. 
V. 
Brown Has No Basis To Assert The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion 
To Dismiss Based On A Lack Of Probable Cause At Preliminary Hearing 
Following This Court's Holding in State v. Manzanares 
On appeal Brown asserts that, even in the face of this Court's contrary 
holding in State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410,272 P.3d 382 (2012), "that when 
a charge has been dismissed pursuant to a conditional guilty plea, challenges to 
the sufficiency of the evidence at a preliminary hearing on such a charge are 
moot for purposes of appeal," the district court erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss for lack of probable cause at preliminary hearing after Brown had entered 
conditional pleas of guilty to amended charges. (Appellant's brief, pp.28-29.) 
The rule of stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed 
unless it is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or 
unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and 
remedy continued injustice. State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 
(2002). Brown has failed to put forth any reason why Mazanares is not 
controlling. His claim must be dismissed. 
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VI. 
Brown Has No Legal Ground To Assert The District Court Erred In Denying 
Brown's Motion To Suppress Founded Solely On Federal Law And The Federal 
Rules Of Criminal Procedure 
Brown filed a motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement 
officials following his out of state arrest. The basis for this motion was Brown's 
contention that he had not been taken before a federal magistrate within six 
hours of his arrest on a fugitive warrant in violation of federal law and the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Tr., p.392, Ls.6-12.) The district court found that 
not only did the federal rules not control in Brown's state action, but Brown was 
"brought before a state magistrate within the times required by both the 
exceptions to Rule 5 [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] and by state 
law." (Tr., p.392, Ls.13-24.) 
Brown nonetheless argues on appeal, "mindful of the inapplicability of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (c) to a state 
prosecution," that the district court erred by denying "his motion to suppress 
statements obtained in violation of those provisions." (Appellant's brief, pp.29-
30.) His argument is unsupported by legal authority for his position and should 
be dismissed. State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510,518,164 P.3d 790, 798 (2007) 
("Grazian makes no citation to authority as required by Idaho Appellate Rule 
35(a)(6) and has not preserved the issue for appellate review"); State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739, 742 (2007) (claim not preserved for appellate 
review where "Diaz failed to present any argument or authority in his opening 
brief to support this contention"); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 
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966, 970 (1996) {"When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of 
law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered."}. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
denials of Brown's motions and affirm his judgment of conviction and sentence. 
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